讲座题目：竞争市场的污染管制（Pollution regulation of competitive markets）
主 讲 人：王新宇博士（“智能投资组合风险管理与供应链金融创新”科研创新团队）
We develop a model of oligopolistic firms that produce partially differentiated products and generate pollution as a byproduct. We analyze and compare two types of pollution regulation: Cap-and-Trade and Taxes. Firms can respond to regulation by any combination of pollution abatement, output reduction, emissions trading (under Cap-and-Trade), or payment of pollution taxes (under Taxes). We prove that well-chosen regulation can, besides reducing pollution, actually improve firms’ profits relative to laissez-faire (unregulated markets), and simultaneously improve consumer surplus and welfare. Thus, regulation Pareto-dominates laissez-faire under a wide range of plausible conditions. These results are driven by an unintended consequence of pollution regulation: Competing firms can use the regulation to tacitly (and credibly) collude to reduce production and improve their profits. We show that the degree of competition plays a critical role in determining the economic consequences of pollution regulation. Our results suggest that the regulator’s primary consideration should be the impact of regulation on consumers rather than producers.
王新宇，管理学博士，菲彩国际官方管理科学与工程学院讲师。主要研究方向为可持续运营管理，经济与管理问题的可计算建模。主持教育部人文社科项目1项，在包括European Journal of Operational Research和Computers and Mathematics with Applications等运筹学领域和计算数学及工程计算领域知名期刊上发表论文多篇。